Coalition formation in a multi-agent inventory problem with two acquisition costs

A. Saavedra Nieves, I. García Jurado, M. G. Fiestras Janeiro

A multi-agent inventory problem is a situation in which several agents face individual inventory problems and agree to coordinate their orders for reducing global costs. We propose a model to deal with a multi-agent inventory problem where several farmers, with no holding cost by storage, cooperate to make joint orders of animal feed. Agents consider two types of product, the usual feeding ration and the shortage feeding ration, with two different acquisition costs. In particular, we suppose that a shortage feeding ration can be cheaper since it may be produced in the farm.

We analyze a new cooperative multi-agent inventory model under these assumptions. The optimal inventory policies are established and a stable coalitional structure is proposed. Finally, an allocation rule for sharing the costs is described and illustrated in a farming community in Spain.

Palabras clave: Multi-agent inventory problems, cooperative games, coalition formation.

M10.3 Logística e Inventarios
6 de septiembre de 2016  17:00
Aula 21.08

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