Bankruptcy solutions for TU-games

J. Sánchez-Soriano, V. Fragnelli, N. Llorca Pascual

A bankruptcy problem is a classical example of a situation in which it is possible to compute a solution that is fair for all the agents involved and requires a very low computational effort. On the other hand, TU-games usually have a very high complexity, for computing both the characteristic function and the solution. In this paper we propose a method that provides a solution for a TU-game profiting of the advantage of a suitably defined bankruptcy problem. The simplest idea is to use only the worth of the grand coalition and the marginal contributions of the players; then we add other information: first the worth of each player standing alone, and finally we take into account all the coalitions.

Palabras clave: Bankruptcy rules, cooperative TU-games

X03.4 Grupo de Teoría de Juegos II
7 de septiembre de 2016  10:00
Aula 21.07

E. Gutiérrez Núñez, N. Llorca Pascual, M. A. Mosquera Rodríguez, J. Sánchez-Soriano

G. Bergantiños Cid, P. Arribillaga

M. Pulido Cayuela, J. Sánchez-Soriano, G. Bergantiños Cid, M. Gómez-Rúa, N. Llorca Pascual

G. Bergantiños Cid, J. J. Vidal Puga