E. Gutiérrez Núñez, N. Llorca Pascual, M. A. Mosquera Rodríguez, J. Sánchez-Soriano
Inspired by the Paris Agreement, in this paper we deal with linear production situations in which there is a cap or limit on the amount of a greenhouse gas that may be emitted. In order to achieve two important purposes of the agreement, a price for each ton of pollutant emitted is considered. We use bankruptcy rules to de fine cooperative games with externalities associated with these situations, and analyze the existence of coalitionally stable allocations of the emission permits.
Palabras clave: linear technologies, limited greenhouse gas emission permits, games with externalities, bankruptcy problems
Programado
X03.4 Grupo de Teoría de Juegos II
7 de septiembre de 2016 10:00
Aula 21.07
