Inventory games: Myopic vs. Farsighted stability

A. Meca

Meca, Timmer, Garcia-Jurado and Borm (2004) introduce the class of inventory cost games. They focus on the stability of grand coalition and prove that it is always a myopic stable outcome.
A recent extension, very close to Meca et al. (2004), is Li, Feng and Zeng (2014). They present the class of inventory games with permissible delay in payments. They prove that the grand coalition is shown to be stable from a farsighted point of view.

Taleizadeh, Meca and Halat (2016) present a new class of inventory games that is strategically equivalent to that class of inventory cost games: inventory games with advance payments. They examine the stability of grand coalition from both a myopic and farsighted perspective, and conclude that it is always stable from both points of view. This study is completed by developing a sensitivity analysis for the model and evaluating the changes produced on the proposed core distribution.

Palabras clave: Inventory games, stability, delay in payments, advance payments

M05.5 Grupo de Teoría de Juegos I
6 de septiembre de 2016  11:00
Aula 21.06

M. A. Puente del Campo, M. Domènech Blàzquez, J. M. Giménez Pradales

J. M. Alonso Meijide, M. Álvarez Mozos, G. Fiestras Janeiro

P. Miranda Menendez, M. Grabisch